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THE WARREN COURT: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
AND CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS 
Paul G. Kauper* 
J. BACKGROUND TO THE WARREN ERA 
T HE Warren Court will be remembered for a number of reasons, but for many Americans it is distinctively and immediately 
identified as the tribunal which put an end to prayer and Bible-
reading exercises in the public schools. These cases were among the 
Court's most highly publicized decisions; they probably generated 
as much discussion, controversy, and criticism of the Court as the 
school desegregation, legislative reapportionment, and police inter-
rogation decisions. The prayer and Bible-reading cases stood out 
among a relatively small but significant body of decisions in which 
the Warren Court was called upon to interpret the twin clauses in 
the opening language of the first amendment: "Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof . . . ." The purpose of this Article is to ana-
lyze the holdings of the Warren Court under these two clauses in 
an attempt to assess their significance by reference both to earlier 
interpretations and to the direction they may give to future devel-
opment. 
Some propositions had been well established before the era of 
the ·warren Court. Fundamental to any consideration of the Su-
preme Court's treatment of religious liberty was the determination 
that the fourteenth amendment made the first amendment appli-
cable to the states. Whatever the theory-whether a fundamental 
rights interpretation OF -an incorporation theory-the Court in the 
pre-Warren period had made clear that the free exercise principle 
explicitly stated in the first amendment as a restriction on Congress 
was equally applicable to the states under the fourteenth amend-
ment.1 The Court also left no doubt that the establishment limita-
tion served as a restriction on the states.2 
The dimensions of religious liberty, as epitomized in the free 
• Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1929, Earlham 
College; J.D. 1932, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
1. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
2. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. l (1947). 
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exercise guarantee, had been well explored by the Supreme Court 
before Chief Justice Warren's tenure began. In a notable series of 
cases primarily involving claims asserted by Jehovah's Witnesses, the 
Court-whether resting its decisions on free speech and free press, 
on a concept of intellectual liberty distilled from the first amend-
ment, or distinctively on religious liberty itself-had opened up a 
wide area for the expression and propagation of religious ideas.3 
Moreover, the cases had established that restrictions on religious 
liberty would not be lightly countenanced and would not be per-
mitted except in cases presenting a clear and present danger to 
important public interests.4 These cases suggested that religious lib-
erty stood at the apex of the first amendment and was, indeed, a 
"preferred freedom." 
By contrast, the interpretation of the establishment limitation 
had given rise to a limited amount of litigation before the Court 
prior to the Warren era. Three important cases had turned on the 
interpretation of this limitation. In Everson v. Board of Education/• 
the Court held that a state could reimburse parents for the cost of 
transporting their children by bus to a parochial school. In reaching 
this result and in stating its interpretation of the establishment 
limitation, the Court, speaking through Justice Black, enunciated 
the famous doctrine that the establishment clause does more than 
prohibit an established church or _preferential treatment for one 
or more religions. According to him, this limitation prohibited 
government from giving any aid to religion, including public spend-
ing "to support any religious activities, or institutions whatever they 
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice 
religion."6 Quoting Thomas Jefferson, Justice Black said that the 
establishment clause was intended to erect "a wall of separation be-
tween church and State."7 In short, the first amendment embodies 
the separation principle. However, New Jersey had not breached the 
wall in the Everson case, since its purpose was not to aid religious 
education but to promote the valid public welfare purpose of pro-
viding safe transportation for children attending parochial schools. 
Thus the Court laid the foundation for the "secular purpose" doc-
3. See P. KAUPER, FRONTIERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY 107-12 (1956). 
4. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
5. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
6. 330 U.S. at 16. 
7. 330 U.S. at 16. 
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trine in the interpretation of the establishment limitation: govern-
ment may advance lawful secular purposes with its spending pro-
grams even though this may result in some incidental benefit to a 
religious group or activity. 
The Everson dictum was translated into a concrete holding in 
the McCollum8 decision; the Court held unconstitutional a program 
whereby public school children were "released" one hour a week 
for religious instruction given on the school premises during the 
regular school day by teachers supplied by the religious communi-
ties. According to the Court, the state was using its public school 
program as a means of recruiting children for religious instruction 
and subjecting them to pressure to attend these classes. 
Shortly thereafter, the Court in Zorach v. Clauson9 sharply lim-
ited .McCollum by holding that a state could promote a plan of 
released time for religious instruction where the instruction did not 
take place on the school premises, even though in other respects the 
plan resembled the one invalidated in McCollum. As the dissenters 
pointed out,10 the decision could hardly be reconciled with the basic 
rationale of !11cCollum; moreover, the emphasis of Justice Douglas' 
majority opinion was a striking departure from Justice Black's opin-
ions in Everson and McCollum. Observing that "[w]e are a religious 
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being,"11 Justice 
Douglas said that the state may properly respect the religious nature 
of our people and accommodate the public service to their spiritual 
needs. Thus, in Zorach the Court laid the foundation for the 
"accommodation theory": a state may, consistent with the establish-
ment limitation, act in a positive way to accommodate its institu-
tions and programs in order to provide the opportunity for its citi-
zens to cultivate religiql!s interests. "While the decision in no sense 
suggests that parents could demand as a matter of constitutional 
right a program of released time, its basic reasoning was indicative 
of the problems awaiting the Court in reconciling possible conflicts 
between the free exercise guarantee and the establishment proscrip-
tion. Both the holding and the tenor of the opinion led some to 
believe that the Court was retreating substantially from the hard 
line of separation which characterized Everson and McCollum. Thus 
8. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
9. 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
10. 343 U.S. at 316 (Justice Black). 322-23 (Justice Frankfurter), 325 (Justice Jackson). 
11. 343 U.S. at 313. 
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after Zorach was decided in 1952, it was possible to speculate that 
the Court was moving to a softer position which would permit state 
programs supportive of religion as long as there was no preferential 
treatment of any religious group and no coercion of dissenters. 
!I. THE WARREN COURT AND THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 
Five cases decided by the Warren Court fall into the general 
category of free exercise of religion. In Kreshik v. St. Nicholas 
Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church,12 the Court held that 
it was an impairment of religious liberty for the New York courts 
to transfer control over St. Nicholas Cathedral in New York City 
from the central governing authority of the Russian Orthodox 
Church to a group which had established an independent Russian 
Church of America. Soon thereafter, the Court in Torcaso v. Wat-
kins13 declared unconstitutional a provision of the Maryland Con-
stitution requiring a justice of the peace to take an oath that he 
believed in God as a condition of taking office. In Braunfeld v. 
Brown14 the Court held that a Sunday closing law did not violate 
the religious liberty of sabbatarians. But in the later case of Sher-
bert v. Verner,15 the Court distinguished Braunfeld and held invalid 
a feature of the South Carolina unemployment compensation law 
which, as interpreted by the state supreme court, required denial of 
unemployment compensation benefits to a person who refused a job 
requiring Saturday employment because of sabbatarian convictions. 
And for reasons pointed out below, United States v. Seeger16 should 
also be included among the Warren Court's free exercise decisions 
even though it did not rest on constitutional grounds. The Court 
there held that a person could qualify for a statutory exemption as 
a conscientious objector under the selective service laws on the basis 
of religious training and belief-defined by statute as "belief in 
relation to a Supreme Being"17-despite the fact that he did not 
profess belief in God in the orthodox sense. 
12. 363 U.S. 190 (1960). 
13. 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
14. 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
15. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
16. United States v. Seeger, also the companion cases, United States v. Jakobson, 
Peter v. United States, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
17. 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1964). This definition was eliminated in the 1967 amend-
ments to the selective service statute. 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (Supp. III), am~nding 
50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1964). 
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The decision in Kreshik, which dealt with the freedom of 
churches as corporate bodies,18 may be contrasted with the remain-
ing free exercise cases during the Warren era, which bore distinc-
tively on the religious liberty of the individual; attention in the 
discussion below will be centered on the latter cases. By invalidating 
the :Maryland oath requirement as a condition of public office, 
Torcaso in effect incorporated into the free exercise clause as a limi-
tation on the states the express limitation in the body of the Con-
stitution that no religious test shall be required as a qualification 
for any office under the United States.19 The case may be viewed as 
resting on the simple proposition that no person may be discrim-
inated against on religious grounds in the enjoyment of public office 
or privilege. While this appears elementary, several curious aspects 
of the opinion give it a special significance. Justice Black, in his 
review of the precedents, repeated passages from Everson and 
McCollum, thereby indicating that the Court was not retreating 
from the interpretation previously given to the establishment limi-
tation. But strangely the Court did not explicitly rest its decision on 
the establishment clause, as it might well have done since freedom 
from coercion to accept an officially prescribed religious belief seems 
clearly to be a central value served by that provision. Moreover, 
Justice Black's observation that the effect of the oath was to 
favor those who profess a particular kind of religion-namely those 
who preferred a belief in God as against persons professing non-
theistic religious beliefs20-points again to what readily appears as 
an argument under the establishment limitation as interpreted in 
Everson. Yet the Court formally grounded its decision on the free 
exercise limitation.21 This suggests that both the free exercise and 
establishment clauses p_rotect against discrimination on religious 
grounds in the enjoyment of public privilege; it also indicates that 
the free exercise clause protects both belief and nonbelief. Moreover, 
the famous footnote in Justice Black's opinion, documenting his 
18. Kreshik was significant in that it extended to judicial action the previous hold-
ing in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. 
America, 344 U.S. 94 (1952), which had invalidated legislative interference with ecclesi-
astical affairs. The Court thereby converted the old federal common-law doctrine of 
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872), into a constitutional rule. See Casad, 
The Establishment Clause and the Ecumenical .Movement, 62 MICH. L. REV. 419 
(1964). 
19. U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. !. 
20. 367 U.S. at 490. 
21. 367 U.S. at 496. 
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point that the oath requirements gave a preference to a particular 
kind of religious belief, suggests a definition of religion which en-
compasses secular and humanistic beliefs and ideologies in addition 
to the traditional types of theistic belief.22 
Seeger and its companion cases should be considered at this point 
for their bearing on Torcaso. The distinctive thing about Seeger is 
that the Court by tour de force interpreted "belief in relation to a 
Supreme Being"-required by statute as an element of the showing 
of religious belief and training necessary to sustain a claim of con-
scientious objector status23-to include any ethical belief which 
parallels the conventional belief in God as a source of moral duty. 
While Seeger rested on statutory grounds, it clearly had constitu-
tional overtones, since a construction which limited exemption as 
a conscientious objector to persons resting their moral convictions 
on conventional theistic grounds would have been subject to attack 
under Torcaso as a discrimination against persons holding non-
theistic ethical beliefs. Taken together, the Torcaso and Seeger opin-
ions point to the conclusion that at least for purposes of the free 
exercise clause, the term "religion" embraces a wide variety of ethi-
cal beliefs, whether founded on theistic concepts or not; that a broad 
freedom of conscience comes within the protection of the free exer-
cise clause; and that by virtue of the first amendment no preference 
may be granted or discrimination practiced by reference to a par-
ticular kind of religious belief as sanctioned by law. 
Braunfeld and Sherbert are probably .the most interesting cases 
of the Warren period on the issue of religious liberty. They deal 
basically with the same problem: whether or not th~ free exercise 
clause protects a person against the indirect re-straint on his religious 
liberty which results when the application of a generally valid law 
places him at a special disadvantage because of his adherence to 
religious duty. Since this problem does not involve governmental 
acts which directly restrict religious acts or discriminate explicitly 
on religious grounds, it falls outside the range of the familiar types 
of restrictions on religious liberty. The issue in Braunfeld was 
whether orthodox Jews and others who because of religious convic-
tion observe a day of rest other than Sunday must be exempted from 
22. "Among religions in this country which do not teach what would generally be 
considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, 
Secular Humanism and others." 367 U.S. at 495 n.11. 
23. See note 17 supra. 
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the coverage of a Sunday closing law. If such an exemption is 
denied, sabbatarians who observe both secular and religious law 
would be subjected to an economic disadvantage since they would 
be required to close their businesses two days per week. In Braunfeld 
the Court refused to go along with this economic discrimination 
argument; it chose to recognize the secular purpose served by Sun-
day closing laws and the importance of having a single day of rest 
prescribed by law. The Court emphasized that the restraint on reli-
gious liberty was an indirect one and asserted that substantial policy 
considerations militated against creating an exemption in favor of 
those who for religious reasons observe another day of rest.24 Point-
ing to the administrative problems of policing a Sunday closing law 
with a recognized exemption based on religious obligation, the 
majority held the state was not constitutionally required to grant 
such an exemption.25 Justice Brennan's strong dissent, supported by 
Justice Stewart, registered the view that this was a burden on the 
free exercise of religion which could not be justified by any compel-
ling state interest.26 
Braunfeld was sharply restricted, if not devitalized, by the later 
holding in Sherbert that South Carolina had violated the free exer-
cise clause in the administration of its unemployment compensation 
law by cutting off unemployment compensation payments to a Sev-
enth D ... y Adventist who had refused a job requiring Saturday work. 
According to the Court, the law forced the sabbatarian to make a 
choice between adhering to her religion and enjoying a public 
benefit; thus, the effect of the law was to discriminate against persons 
with religious objections to Saturday work.21 The Court emphasized 
that only a compelling state interest warrants a restriction on reli-
gious liberty,28 and the ,case makes clear that this standard is equally 
applicable to so-called indirect restraints on religious freedom. 
Justice Brennan, who wrote the majority opinion, attempted to dis-
tinguish the Braunf eld case on the ground that the same public 
24. !166 U.S. at 606-09. 
25. !166 U.S. at 608-09. 
26. 366 U.S. at 610, 616. Justice Douglas dissented on the grounds both that the 
Sunday closing laws were laws establishing religion and that in so far as they com-
pelled observance by sabbatarians they violated the free exercise clause. 
27. The South Carolina law did recognize the position of a person who objected 
to working on Sundays on religious grounds, and the Court in support of its conclu-
sion could, therefore, use the further argument that the law thereby discriminated 
against persons whose religion required a different day of rest. 
28. !174 U.S. at 406. 
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policy considerations that justified a state in not exempting sabba-
tarians from a Sunday closing law were not present here.29 Justices 
Douglas30 and Stewart31 in their concurring opinions, and Justice 
Harlan in his dissent,82 indicated that they were not persuaded by 
this effort. Indeed, as Justice Harlan observed, the economic burden 
placed on the sabbatarian who complies with a Sunday closing law 
is greater than that suffered by an individual who is denied unem-
ployment benefits for a restricted period of time.33 
Perhaps it is only a matter of time before the Court reconsiders 
Braunfeld; in any event, the Sherbert case stands out as probably 
the landmark case during the Warren period on the question of 
religious liberty. The result of the Court's decision is to protect 
discrete minorities against laws which, while serving valid public 
purposes, have the effect of putting these groups at a special dis-
advantage. Equally important is -the general proposition formulated 
in Sherbert that only compelling state interests warrant measures 
which substantially infringe upon the free exercise of religion. The 
impact of this formulation is evident in later cases decided by other 
courts.84 Indeed, in view of its strong stand in Sherbert, it is sur-
prising that the Court refused to review the Kansas Supreme Court's 
decision in Kansas v. Garber,35 the Amish school case, thus passing 
up the opportunity to deal with the important issues of religious 
liberty raised therein. 
III. THE w ARREN COURT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
Three important cases distinctively turning on the interpretation 
of the establishment clause were decided during the period under 
29. 374 U.S. at 408-09. 
30. 374 U.S. at 411-12. 
31. 374 U.S. at 417-18. 
32. 374 U.S. at 421. 
33. 374 U.S. at 421. 
34. See, e.g., People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (A state narcotics 
law could not constitutionally be applied to penalize the use by a California Indian 
tribe of peyote as part of a religious ceremony.); In re Jenison, 267 Minn. 136, 125 
N.W.2d 588 (1963) (A Jehovah's Witness could not be required to serve on a jury 
where this ran counter to religious conviction). See also Galanter, Religious Freedoms 
in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 Wis. L. R.Ev. 217; Gianella, Religious 
Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, Part I, The Religious Liberty 
Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1381 (1967). 
35. 197 Kansas 567, 419 P.2d 896 (1966), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 389 U.S. 
51 (1967). Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Fortas were of the opinion 
that probable jurisdiction should have been noted. 
The Kansas Supreme Court held that the right of the Amish parents founded on 
religious considerations to direct the education of their children after reaching high 
school age was subordinate to the state's power to insure ":'hat it regarded as proper 
minimum education for all children in the state. 
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review. In Engel v. Vitale36 and Schempp v. School District of A bing-
ton Township,31 prayer and Bible-reading exercises in the public 
schools were condemned as a form of establishment.38 Supplying 
textbooks free of charge to parochial school children was upheld in 
Board of Education v. Allen.39 In addition, the Court upheld the 
validity of Sunday closing laws.40 To these decisions must be added 
the recent holding in Flast v. Cohen41 that a federal taXpayer has 
standing to challenge the constitutionality of federal spending 
alleged to violate the establishment limitation. To complete the 
picture, it should be noted that the Court passed up opportunities 
to review state court cases dealing with the validity of governmental 
grants to church-related colleges42 and the validity of tax exemptions 
for property used for religious purposes.43 
The cases dealing with religious exercises in public schools and 
state-financed distribution of textbooks to parochial school children 
have perhaps the greatest impact and long-run significance in terms 
of the substantive interpretation of the establishment clause. As pre-
viously observed, the prayer and Bible-reading cases, declaring in-
valid practices which had long been sanctioned in a number of states, 
attracted great attention and provoked widespread public contro-
versy. These dtcisions generated charges that the Warren Court was 
godless and hostile to religion and led to a substantial, but in the 
end unsuccessful, movement in support of a constitutional amend-
!16. !170 U.S. 421 (1962). 
!17. !174 U.S. 20!1 (196!1). See also the companion case, Murray v. Curlett, !174 U.S. 20!1 
(196!1). 
!18. In Engel the Court held that the daily use in New York schools of the so-
called Regents' Prayer violated the establishment clause. At the next term in the 
Schempp and Murray cases the Court broadened the Engel holding to include Bible-
reading and the recitation Qf. the Lord's Prayer. Justice Stewart wrote dissenting 
opinions in these cases. 
!19. !192 U.S. 2!16 (1968). 
40. McGowan v. Maryland, !166 U.S. 420 (1961). 
41. !192 U.S. 8!1 (1968). 
42. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that capital grants by the legislature to 
church-related colleges which the Court found to be "sectarian" institutions, violated 
the establishment clause of the first amendment. Horace Mann League of the United 
States v. Board of Public Works, 242 Md. 645, 220 A.2d 51 (1966), cert. denied, !185 
U.S. 97 (1966). Justices Harlan and Stewart were of the opinion that certiorari should 
have been granted. 
4!1. The California, Rhode Island, and Maryland courts held that such exemp-
tions did not violate the establishment clause. Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 
Cal. 2d 644, 298 P.2d 1, appeal dismissed sub nom. Heisey v. County of Alameda, 
!152 U.S. 921 (1956) Uustices Black and Frankfurter dissenting); Gene_ral Fin. Corp. v. 
Archetto, 176 A.2d 7!1 (R.I. 1961), appeal dismissed, !169 U.S. 42!1 (1962) Uustice Black 
dissenting); Murray v. Comptroller of Treasury, 241 Md. !18!1, 216 A.2d 897, cert. 
denied, Murray v. Goldstein, !185 U.S. 816 (1966). 
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ment to validate the practices held unconstitutional by the Court,H 
These cases definitely established the secular character of the public 
schools as a constitutional requirement; they also suggested ques-
tions about the validity of all religious observances in public life. 
Equally important, however, was that in Schempp the Court made 
clear that the objective study of religion and of the Bible in its liter-
ary and historical aspects is properly a part of public education. This 
recognition gave a special positive significance to these cases. 
The Allen case, which upheld the public lending of secular text-
books free of charge to children in parochial schools, is significant 
not only because it affirms and extends the secular-purpose doctrine 
of Everson, but also because it suggests openings for other types of 
federal and state programs designed to provide benefits to church-
related institutions or students attending church-related schools. The 
decision has great relevance for federal spending programs already 
underway and for similar state programs already adopted or under 
consideration.45 
In the long run, the Flast case may turn out to be the Warren 
Court's most important decision on church-state problems. The issue 
was whether a federal taxpayer has standing to challenge a federal 
appropriation on the ground that it violates the establishment 
clause. In Frothingham v. Mellon,46 decided in 1923, the Court had 
held that a federal taxpayer did not have the requisite interest to 
challenge spending for a purpose allegedly beyond the legislative 
competence of Congress. It has been commonly assumed since Froth-
ingham that the. case stood as a bar to any suit -ay a federal taxpayer 
to challenge federal spending on constitutional or statutory grounds. 
But in Flast the Court limited Frothingham by holding that a fed-
eral taxpayer does have standing to . challenge federal spending 
44. On various proposals to amend the Constitution to permit prayer and Bible-
reading exercises in the public schools, see Proposed Amendments to the Constitution 
Relating to School Prayers, Bible Reading, etc., L1. Staff Study for the House Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (Committee Print 1964); Hearings on Proposed 
Amendments to the Constitution Relating to Prayers and Bible Reading in the 
Public Schools Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). 
See also Note, School Prayer and the Becker Amendments, 53 Gi::o. L.J. 192 (1964). 
45. Pennsylvania recently enacted legislation authorizing grants to private schools 
as a contribution to the cost of providing secular educational services. Act. No. 109, 24 
P.S. §§ 5601-09 Reg. Sess. (1968), 3 PURDON's PENNSYL\'ANIA LE:GISLATI\'E Sl:RVICE 232 
(1968). A proposal to authorize limited tuition grants to parents sending children to 
private schools was introduced at the recent session of the Michigan legislature. S.B. 
1124 Reg. Sess. (1968). 
46. 262 us. 447. 
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allegedly violative of the establishment clause, since this clause is a 
specific limitation on Congress and impliedly creates a right in fed-
eral taxpayers to be free from spending which amounts to an estab-
lishment of religion. By finding such a right in the taxpayer, the 
Court actually built on a substantive interpretation in order to meet 
the remedial problem.47 The specific holding in Flast is particularly 
significant since, until this decision, the Frothingham doctrine had 
barred litigation instituted by taxpayers challenging the use of fed-
era_l funds, under authority of statutes directed to general welfare 
purposes, to aid church-related activities or institutions. We may 
now expect a spate of federal cases challenging such uses of funds. 
Perhaps decisive answers will soon be forthcoming to questions 
which have been the subject of prolonged controversy but which 
have gone unresolved for lack of a proper party to present the issue. 
An incidental effect of the decision may be to put an end to pro-
posals for legislation which would expressly vest federal courts with 
jurisdiction to hear taxpayers' suits challenging federal appropria-
tions on first amendment grounds.48 
"What contributions, if any, did the Warren Court make to the 
doctrinal development of the establishment clause? One thing is 
quite clear: the notion which developed after the Zorach case that 
the Court was about to engage in a general retreat from ideas ex-
pressed in Everson and McCollum proved to be ill-founded. At least 
the ·warren Court has taken occasion in its opinions to reaffirm gen-
eral ideas expressed in earlier decisions indicating a hard line on 
separation. Whether the Court means what it says, and whether 
everything it says can be reconciled with its holdings is another 
matter. The Court's tendency to cite and quote from prior decisions 
in cases raising the esta'bUshment issue obscures the doctrinal devel-
opment. For instance, in the Torcaso case, which appeared formally 
to rest on the free exercise clause, Justice Black reviewed his prior 
47. Dilution of the standing requirement in establishment cases was evident already 
in the prayer and Bible-reading cases where the Court held that it was not necessary 
to prove an invasion of personal freedom in order to challenge a school practice on 
establishment grounds. Parents objecting to these religious practices brought the 
suits in these cases. Justice Black in Engel did not even discuss standing, Justice Clark 
and Justice Brennan mentioned the standing problems in footnotes in their opinions 
in Schempp (374 U.S. at 224 n.9, 266 n.30). 
48. Senator Ervin proposed such legislation in 1966. See Hearings on S. 2097 Before 
the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). For discussion of the proposed legislation, see Editorial Note, 
The Insular Status of the Religion Clauses: The Dilemma of Standing, 36 GEO. WASH. 
L. REv. 648 (1968). 
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opinions in Everson and Mccollum and found in them support for 
the idea that the state cannot involve itself in religious matters by 
prescribing a religious test for public office. And, in stating its posi-
tion on the establishment clause in the Sunday closing cases, the 
Court reviewed at length the earlier cases from Everson through 
Zorach, again suggesting that it was not rejecting the prior learning. 
In the end, of course, the Court found the Sunday closing laws valid 
on the basis of the exception to the separation principle suggested 
in the Everson case itself: that laws directed toward secular ends are 
valid even though they result in incidental benefits for religious 
purposes. In this sense the Sunday closing cases added no new doc-
trinal development and simply affirmed the basic rationale of the 
Everson holding. It should be noted, however, that both Chief Jus-
·tice Warren in his majority opinion49 and Justice Frankfur~r in his 
extended concurring opinion50 did suggest the further consideration 
that even a law which incidentally aids religion while furthering a 
secular purpose may be invalid if alternatives are open to the state 
for achieving the same result without conferring this incidental ben-
efit. Justice Brennan also referred to this test in his extended con-
curring opinion in the Schempp case,51 discussed below. The alter-
native-means approach has important implications as a limitation 
on the secular-purpose doctrine, but it remains to be determined 
whether this test has assumed a definitive significance in the inter-
pretation of the establishment clause. If it has attained such a sig-
nificance, it is still unclear how the test is to be applied in a variety 
of situations. 
The school prayer and Bible-reading cases offer the greatest in-
sight into the Court's current thinking about the establishment 
clause. In the first case, Engel v. Vitale,52 the Court dealt rather 
simply with the New York Regents' prayer by saying that a statute 
which prescribed a prayer for daily use in the public schools violated 
a fundamental purpose of the establishment clause, which was de-
signed· to prohibit governmental sanction for any kind of religious 
belie£ or practice. Justice Black's opinion was notable because, ex-
cept for one brief reference to the Everson case in a footnote, it 
completely lacked documentation. This suggested that while speak-
49. 366 U.S. at 450-52. 
50. 366 U.S. at 466-67. 
51. 374 U.S. at 294-95. 
52. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
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ing for the majority of the Court in writing an opinion designed to 
secure as much support as possible, he was not disposed to give inter-
pretations of prior cases which might alienate such support. Obvi-
ously any reliance on AlcCollum, which some felt would have justi-
fied the result, would have required an attempt to distinguish 
Zorach. But Justice Black did make the important point that it was 
not necessary for the petitioners, who were parents, to show that 
there was an invasion of religious liberty; since the establishment 
clause is an independent ground for d_ecision, a showing that the 
challenged practice also violates the free exercise clause is not re-
quired. 53 
The Schempp case,54 which followed in quick succession and 
which dealt with the issue of both prayer and Bible-reading in the 
public schools, was far more revealing in terms of the Court's inter-
pretation of the establishment clause. Justice Clark, writing for the 
majority, reviewed all the prior cases and did not suggest any basic 
incompatibility between McCollum and Zorach. While reaffirming 
the holding in Engel that the establishment clause prohibits ritual-
istic exercises in the public schools, even though attendance is volun-
tary, he went on at great length to justify the Court's conclusions in 
the case before it and to allay fears that the Court was intent on an 
antireligious course with respect to the public schools. He affirmed 
the view that for the purpose of raising an establishment clause 
question it was not necessary to prove a violation of religious liberty. 
The really critical part of his establishment interpretation, however, 
appeared in that part of the opinion stating that what the first 
amendment requires is neutrality.55 This marks the first time that 
neutrality as a central canon of interpretation appeared in the cases. 
Justice Black had alreqqy mentioned neutrality in Everson; he said 
that if the state elected to be neutral as between children attending 
public and parochial schools in the matter of providing bus trans-
portation the Court could not say that this was unconstitutional.56 
The Court would not force the state, in administering a program 
aimed at the safe transportation of school children, to discriminate 
against children going to parochial schools. And Justice Douglas in 
Zorach stated that government must be neutral on the issue of com-
53. 370 U.S. at 430. 
54. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, also Murray v. Curlett, 374 U.S. 
203 (1963). 
55. 374 U.S. at 215, 222-27. 
56. 330 U.S. at 17-18. 
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petition between sects.07 But it was in Schempp that neutrality, as 
opposed to separation, assumed a position of primary importance in 
the interpretation of the establishment clause. 
This was a significant development, in part because neutrality 
had been proposed by several writers as the authoritative guide to 
interpretation. Professor Katz had stated that the underlying purpose 
of both religion clauses is to promote religious liberty; that separa-
tion is a subordinate instrumental concept to achieve this purpose; 
and that while the establishment clause requires government to be 
neutral as between religion and nonreligion, this neutrality must be 
interpreted in the light of the free exercise clause. Thus, neutrality 
cannot be used as a basis for denying the free exercise of religion or 
for discriminating on a religious basis in the dispensation of public 
benefits.58 Professor Kurland, in his instructive study of the Supreme 
Court's decisions, propounded the theory that what the first amend-
ment forbids is a classification which results in either preference or 
discrimination based on the religious factor.59 This theory, too, re-
sults in a neutralistic interpretation in the sense that laws and prac-
tices must be general in application and must not be designed to 
favor or discriminate against religion. 
In implementing the neutrality idea in Schempp, Justice Clark 
said that the decisive test was whether either the purpose or the 
primary effect of the enactment was the advancement or inhibition 
of religion: "That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the 
E~blishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and 
a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."60 This 
test fits in well with the neutrality idea-neutrality is identified with 
secularity of both ends and means. The difficulty with Schempp is 
that there is no indication in Justice Clark's opinion that the Court 
was rejecting the Zorach case, where there was clearly a breach of 
the neutrality idea in that the Court sanctioned a state program 
which_ was deliberately designed to further the religious interests of 
parents and children. Moreover, the emphasis in Justice Clark's 
opinion on the compulsive aspects of the Bible-reading and prayer 
exercises somewhat weakens the conclusion that these exercises were 
invalid simply because they reflected a positive interest of the state 
57. 343 U.S. at 314. 
58 •. Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 426 (1953). 
59. P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW (1962). 
60. 374 U.S. at 222. 
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in religious matters. Instead, the opinion suggests that their invalid-
ity turned on the element of coercion implicit in the school situa-
tion. This ambiguity is reflected also in the separate opinion of 
Justice Goldberg, joined by Justice Harlan. While agreeing that the 
state must be neutral toward religion, nevertheless they warned that 
an untutored devotion to neutrality could lead to results which par-
take of "a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a 
passive, or even active, hostility to the religious"-results which are 
not only not compelled by the Constitution, but are prohibited by 
it. 01 Justice Brennan, in a long concurring opinion expressing his 
adherence to neutrality and the results reached in Engel and 
Schempp, listed a whole series of cases where he thought the state 
could accommodate these programs to serve religious interests.62 But 
there can be no reconciliation between strict neutrality and the 
neutrality which permits or requires an accommodation to religious 
interests.63 This difference is suggested by Justice Clark's opinion 
in Schempp, where he spoke both of "strict neutrality, neither aiding 
nor opposing religion,"64 and of "wholesome neutrality.''65 
So while the Schempp case spoke much of neutrality, the various 
opinions are ambiguous on this question. It is evident that not all 
members of the Court are ready to accept the Kurland idea that the 
state can do nothing which in any way uses the religious factor as 
the basis for preferential classification. It seems clear that prayer and 
Bible-reading practices have been held invalid not simply because 
they violate the neutrality principle but because this particular 
breach of neutrality has involved the states so deeply in i:eligious 
matters as to have a coercive effect on the liberty of dissenters and 
nonconformists.66 Schempp can thus be viewed as a case protecting 
the freedom of the miqqrity. 
On the same day the Court decided the Schempp case, it held in 
61. 374 U.S. at 306. 
62. 374 U.S. at 294-304. 
63. For analysis of the neutrality emphasis in the Schempp opinion, see Kauper, 
Schempp and Sherbert, Studies in Neutrality and Accommodation, 1963 RELIGION AND 
THE PUBLIC ORDER 3, 10-23. See also Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and 
Doctrinal De-l!elopment, Part II, The Xonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 
513 (1968). 
64. 374 U.S. at 225. 
65. 374 U.S. at 222. 
66. See, e.g., the stalement in Justice Goldberg's concuning opinion that the "per• 
vasive religiosity and direct governmental inYolvement inhering in the prayer and 
Bible-reading practices" could not be characterized simply as accommodation by the 
~tatc in the interests of religious liberty. 374 l'.S. at 307. 
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Sherbert61 that as a matter of constitutional right a Seventh Day 
Adventist, because of her religion, was entitled to special treatment 
under the South Carolina unemployment compensation law. Here 
the Court approached the problem from the vantage point of the 
free exercise clause. The deliberate legislative policy of giving aid 
to religious groups through exemptions in tax and regulatory laws, 
evident in both federal and state statutes, cannot be reconciled with 
neutrality. Yet the Court in Sherbert went beyond saying that a 
legislature may grant a preferential exclusion on religious grounds 
and held that it must do so. The free exercise clause as interpreted 
in Sherbert thus negates neutrality. At the same time, the constitu-
tionally required accommodation to religious liberty does not in 
this case , violate the establishment clause-even though it departs 
from neutrality-since here the state's involvement in i"digion is 
minimal and the positive assistance given to -one ci:1:11:-en's religious 
beliefs poses no threat to others' theistic or nontheistic beliefs.68 
Schempp and Sherbert can be reconciled, not on the basis of an 
abstract conception ·of neutrality, but on the basis that both serve to 
protect important facets of the basic liberty that gives unity to the 
religion clauses of the first amendment. Given this explanation, 
Schempp was a significant contribution to the meaning of religious 
liberty in our pluralistic society. 
The decision in Allen, 69 holding that it does not violate the 
establishment clause for a state to lend secular textbooks free of 
charge to children in parochial schools, has important implications-
even though on the surface it adds nothing new to the interpretation 
of the establishment limitation. Obviously the result fits the neutral-
ity theory, since the state here elected to pursue a policy of not dis-
criminating against parochial school children in the disbursement of 
funds for educational purposes. On the other hand, it is quite clear 
that Allen is not consistent with a s_trict separation theory, at least 
in terms of the doctrinaire no-assistance idea expressed in Everson. 
Yet it can be reconciled with the actual holding in Everson on the 
ground that, even under a strict separation theory, the state is not 
precluded from pursuing secular purpose programs which give inci-
dental aid to religion. This is precisely the theory on which the 
6i. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
68. 374 U.S. at 409. See Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment 
Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692 (1968). 
69. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
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Allen case rests. Following the decision in the prayer and Bible-
reading cases, the question had arisen whether Everson was still good 
law. Everson had been decided by a five-to-four vote, and Justice 
Douglas, who voted with the majority, subsequently indicated that 
he thought Everson had been wrongly decided.70 A very substantial 
change has occurred in the Court's personnel in the meantime. Of 
the nine Justices who participated in Everson, only Justices Black 
and Douglas are now on the bench. Both dissented in Allen along 
with Justice Fortas. This means that the majority in the Allen case 
consisted of six Justices who did not take part in Everson. Justice 
'White, who delivered the majority opinion which received the sup-
port of five other Justices, rested the case squarely on the authority 
of Everson and its sect1lar-purpose theory.71 In this connection, he 
also made a revealing use of the primary purpose-primary effect test 
enunciated by Justice Clark in Schempp. 
Allen does more than merely affirm Everson. It rejects the notion 
that the Everson holding is limited to forms of aid for parochial 
school children, such as transportation, school lunches, and health 
programs which, unlike books, are not directly involved in the teach-
ing and learning processes. Perhaps what is really important about 
Allen is its affirmation of the role of private education in the Amer-
ican educational system, the recognition that parochial schools serve 
a secular purpose in addition to their sectarian function, and the 
clear acceptance of the idea that the establishment clause is no bar 
to state assistance in furthering this secular function.72 
Allen opens up new vistas for application of the secular purpose 
theory. It should be pointed out, however, that the Court has never 
dealt with the question whether government may make direct grants 
to church-related educaf~onal institutions on a theory of assisting 
70. See his concurring opinion in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962). 
71. 392 U.S. at 242-44. 
72. 392 U.S. at 247-48 (footnotes omitted): 
Underlying these cases, and underlying also the legislative judgments that have 
preceded the coun decisions, has been a recognition that private education has 
played and is playing a significant and valuable role in raising national levels 
of knowledge, competence, and experience. Americans care about the quality of 
the secular education aYailable to their children. They have considered high quality 
education to be an indispensable ingredient for achieving the kind of nation, 
and the kind of citizenry, that they have desired to create. Considering this atti-
tude, the continued willingness to rely on private school systems, including 
parochial systems, strongly suggests that a wide segment of informed opinion, 
legislative and otherwise, has found that those schools do an acceptable job of 
providing secular education to their students. This judgment is further evidence 
that parochial schools are performing, in addition to their sectarian function, 
the task of secular education. 
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them in the performance of secular functions. In Everson the school 
board reimbursed the parents for the cost of students' transporta-
tion. In Allen the state supplied textbooks which had to be approved 
by the state department of education although the parochial school 
authorities made the initial choice (a point emphasized in the dis-
senting opinions).73 Reserved for future decision is the question of 
to what extent the concept of secular purpose or of neutrality, in-
voked to support various forms of governmental aid for parochial 
school education, is limited by the manner in which the benefit is 
conferred, the extent of state involvement in religious affairs, .and 
the retention of public administrative control.74 
The cases interpreting the establishment clause have done little 
to resolve the conceptual ambiguities bequeathed by the pre-Warren 
decisions. On the one hand, the Court, while continuing to pay 
verbal respect to the strict-separation theory first emmciatecl. in 
Everson, has used the opening provided by tnat case for the secular 
purpose doctrine. I~ followed this theory in the Sunday closing cases 
and in the school textbook cases. On the other hand, in Schempp 
the Court formulated a neutrality theory as the central canon in the 
construction of the establishment limitation. Yet we may wonder 
what kind of neutrality the Court was talking about. Indeed, Justice 
Harlan has recently observed that "[n]eutrality is a coat of many 
colors."75 Because of the degree of state involvement, neutrality obvi-
ously suited the Schempp case as a theory for decision. But the Court 
did not disavow Zorach, which rested on accommodation; and on 
the very same day that it decided Schempp, it limited neutrality by 
holding in Sherbert that a state was ·required in the name of free 
exercise to grant a religious exemption from a law which served a 
vali4 public purpose. Moreover, in Allen, where the Court could have 
used neutrality as an adequate basis for decision, it chose instead to 
pursue the secular purpose theory. In following and expanding 
upon this theory, the Courf said nothing about the alternative-
73. 392 U.S. at 254-55, 269-70. 
74. Answering the argument that all teaching in a sectarian school is religious or 
that the processes of secular and religious training are so intertwined that secular 
textbooks furnished to students by the public are in fact instrumental in the teaching 
of religion, the Court said in the Allen case that nothing in the record supported the 
proposition that all textbooks are used by the parochial schools to teach religion. "We 
are unable to hold, based solely on judicial notice, that this statute results in unconsti-
tutional involvement of the State with religious instruction." 392 U.S. at 248. 
See Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CAUF. L. 
REV. 260 (1968). 
75. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968). 
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means test which it had intimated in the Sunday closing cases was 
a limitation on the application of the secular-purpose concept.76 
IV. CONCLUSION 
On the whole there can be no serious quarrel ·with the results 
reached by the ,varren Court in the cases arising under the religion 
clauses of the first amendment. The Court, distinguished generally 
for its emphasis on libertarian values, has been sensitive and hos-
pitable to claims made in the name of religious liberty-which 
encompasses a wide variety of values served by both the free exercise 
and establishment clauses. The free exercise clause has been em-
ployed effectively to protect discrete minorities, dissenters, and non-
believers. The "compelling considerations of public policy" test has 
taken its place along with the "clear and present danger" test as a 
judicial vehicle for invalidating both direct and indirect restraints 
which operate in a substantial way to burden the free exercise of 
religion. ·whatever other criticisms may be directed against the 
·warren Court, a fair reading of these opinions should dispel the 
notion that it has been hostile to religion. 
A common thread running through the decisions under both of 
the religion clauses is an awareness of and sensitivity to the demands 
both for equality of treatment in a religiously pluralistic society and 
for special protection of minority groups against the claims and as-
sumptions of the majority. The prayer and Bible-reading cases must 
ultimately rest on the cons~deration that religious exercises in public 
schools, though sanctioned by the majority, constitute a substantial 
threat to the liberty of nonconforming groups. Similarly, the Court's 
decision in Allen reflects a judicial appreciation of the pluralistic 
character of our educational system and the freedom of choice im-
plicit within it. 
Leaving aside the results, one may venture criticism of the way in 
which the Court handled some of the cases. Braunfeld seems clearly 
out of line with Sherbert, and it may be asked why the Court did not 
overrule it in the latter decision instead of distinguishing it on 
76. See note 48 supra and accompanying text. 
It may be argued abstractly that it is unnecessary for the state to help further the 
fecular education of children attending parochial schools since they are free to attend 
the public schools in order to obtain a secular education. Omission of any considera-
tion of the alternative means test in Allen may suggest that this test has no relevancy 
if the alternative means for achieving the intended public benefit requires the sacrifice 
of important constitutional freedoms. 
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grounds that are hardly persuasive. A large part of the public furor 
aroused by Justice Black's blunt opinion in Engel might well have 
been avoided if the Court had given thought to the public impact 
of the decision and dealt more discreetly with the issue-as Justice 
Clark did in the later Sche1J1,pp opinion. And, in turn, both decisions 
would have been strengthened had the Court bottomed the holdings 
on the psychologically coercive aspects of religious practices in the 
classroom. 
The earlier analysis of the Court's interpretation of the establish-
ment clause points up the continued failure to resolve the ambigu-
ities, if not inconsistencies, bequeathed by the opinions of the pre-
Warren era. Although neutrality appears to have emerged as the 
dominant theme, the cases reveal no clear perception of what is 
meant by neutrality. How is it reconciled with the separation prin-
ciple stressed in the language of Everson? Does neutrality yield to a 
superior demand of religious liberty? Is there a difference between 
"secular purpose" and "neutrality"? And is the Court prepared to 
push the "alternative means" test as a limitation on secular purpose? 
The resolution of these questions depends upon a systematic analysis 
and ordering of the values implicit in the religion clauses of the first 
amendment. This is a task the Warren Court will pass on to its 
successor. Ironically, by opening up the floodgates to litigation in 
the Flast decision, the Warren Court has made certain that the post-
Warren Court will have the opportunity to undertake this task. 
